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A NEW AGE OF PRO-EMPLOYER RIGHTS:  
ARE AUTOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS THE STANDARD? 
Shannon H. Hedvat* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge and innovation have increasingly become the drivers 
behind the (private) economic sector, particularly through intangible assets 
created from ―intellectual capital.‖
1
  A company‘s market value is now 
greatly dependent upon the company‘s intangible assets rather than its 
tangible assets.
2
  The rising significance of ―intellectual capital,‖ 
particularly patents, requires companies to carefully consider how to 
categorize the ownership of employees‘ innovations developed while under 
employment.  The Federal Circuit‘s 2008 decision in DDB Technologies, 
LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, holding that federal law, not state law, 
governs the interpretation of patent assignments in employment 
agreements,
3
 creates several concerns for many current and potential 
companies, employers, and employees.  The effects on innovation, research 
and development, hiring patterns, and other corporate decisions in several 
industries may be more substantial than the Federal Circuit anticipated. 
Consequently, an analysis of the effects of the DDB Technologies 
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 1. James E. Malackowski et al., Innovation Measurement: The Economic Impact of 
Patent Value 1 (2007) 
http://www.innovationmetrics.gov/comments/051107OceanTomo.pdf.  ―Intellectual capital‖ 
is categorized as ―a company‘s intangible assets, including those assets traditionally referred 
to as intellectual property—patents, trademarks and copyrights.‖  Id. 
 2. Id.  ―[I]ntangible value as a percentage of market value has grown from 16.8% in 
1975, to 32.4% in 1985, to 68.4% in 1995, and to 79.7% in 2005.‖  Id.  Over 30 years, 
therefore, the percentage of market value increased almost five times its value since 1975. 
 3. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
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decision is necessary, especially as it was a case of ―first impression.‖
4
  
This examination begins with an overview of the history behind the 
relationship between employee innovations and employers.  In particular, 
Part II of this Comment explores the evolution from a ―pro-employee‖ and 
―individual genius‖ approach to one favoring employers with respect to 
innovation ownership and rights.  Part III of this Comment then examines 
the facts and reasoning underlying the Federal Circuit‘s groundbreaking 
decision in DDB Technologies.  Part IV subsequently investigates the 
significance of employee innovations for both firms and inventors from an 
economic, financial, equitable, and contractual perspective.  Finally, this 
Comment concludes with a projection and analysis into how the DDB 
Technologies decision may affect the employer-employee relationship and 
how it may drastically change the method through which each party arrives 
at its decisions in launching a new employment relationship. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE INNOVATION 
AND EMPLOYERS 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power ―to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.‖
5
  Patent law has recognized this idea of protected invention as 
a product of ―individual genius.‖
6
  The history of employers‘ rights to an 
employee‘s ―individual genius‖ can be divided into three stages.  First, 
from 1840 to the mid-1880s, an inventor‘s employment status was 
irrelevant in determining patent ownership.
7
  After the 1880s, however, 
courts began to recognize the ―shop right rule,‖
8
 although they infrequently 
awarded it despite employers‘ emphasis on hiring particular individuals 
solely to invent.
9
  Finally, the third stage of the development of the current 
 
 4. Mike Baniak & Todd Dawson, Discussion of Employer Assignment Agreements 
after DDB Technologies v. MLB Advanced Media, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 298, 307 
(2009). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 6. Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law 
and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1139 (1998). 
 7. Id. at 1132-33. 
 8. The ―shop right rule‖ grants an employer the right to practice a given employee‘s 
invention when the idea was conceived and perfected during the hours of employment and 
with the employer‘s resources.  United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 
196 (1933) (citing Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); McClurg v. Kingsland, 
42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843)).  For a discussion on the difference between an ―implied 
license‖ and ―shop rights,‖ see ROBERT PATRICK MERGERS & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1198 (4th ed. 2007) and Annotation, 
Right to Inventions as Between Employer and Employee, 153 A.L.R. 983 (1944). 
 9. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1132-33. 
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legal doctrine, covering employers‘ rights to employees‘ innovations, was 
greatly influenced by the emergence and prevalence of contracts in the 
1900s.
10
  This period represented a trend toward an invention ownership 
approach that has been adopted by courts and companies today, 
demonstrating the evolution from the focus on the ―individual genius‖ to 
one on corporate decision-making.
11
 
A.  Individual Genius as a Determinant of Patent Ownership 
Traditionally, individual efforts, not those related to an ―employer-
sponsored research agenda,‖ produced the most inventions.
12
  Courts 
initially demonstrated a strong opposition to employment contracts 
granting rights to employers for employees‘ innovations.
13
  This approach 
was consistent with the labor theory developed by John Locke.
14
  Locke‘s 
principle maintains that inventors have a natural right to their inventions 
(―property‖) because such innovations are results of their labor and 
efforts.
15
  Nonetheless, courts implemented and widely applied different 
strategies during earlier periods, when holding that a contract did not assign 
patent rights to employers. 
 
 10. Id.  In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized ―[t]he 
general right [of an employer] to make a contract in relation to his business [a]s part of the 
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution.‖  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 
165 U.S. 578 (1897)).  
 11. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1132-33. 
 12. Id. at 1139. 
 13. Id. at 1185-97.  ―The hostility toward contracts assigning employees‘ future patents 
was articulated most pointedly in Aspinwell Mfg. Co. v. Gill, an early influence federal 
circuit case involving an inventor who assigned his patent to a manufacturing firm and then 
went to work for the firm making the product.‖  Id. at 1186 (discussing Aspinwell Mfg. Co. 
v. Gill, 32 F. 697 (Cir. Ct. Dist. Ct. N.J. 1887)).  However, in cases where it was clear that 
the employee agreed to assign his future rights to his employer, courts would then hold such 
contracts enforceable.  See Littlefield v. Perry, 88. U.S. (21 Wall.) 205 (1874) (holding that 
contracts and their provisions assigning future rights to inventions were enforceable). 
 14. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in 
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138 (Stephen R. Munzer 
ed., 2001); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 299-
302 (1988).  Locke‘s theory is applicable to intellectual property as it awards an individual 
for her labor by automatically granting her the rights to the ―fruits‖ of her efforts and work, 
which in intellectual property would be the rights conferred upon the issuance of a patent (or 
in certain cases a copyright, trademark, or trade secret). 
 15. ―Intellectual Property law has been framed around the ancient notion that individual 
labor (creativity) deserves a prize, and that the recognition of exclusive property rights 
constitutes such a prize.‖  Ugo Mattei & Andrea Pradi, Property Rights: A Comparative 
Law and Economics Perspective in the Global Era, in PROPERTY RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW 
AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 40, 50 (Donatella Porrini & Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., 
2007). 
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First, unless there was a clear contractual provision establishing 
ownership of inventions, courts would not interpret any assignment of 
rights (to employers) into agreements.  Furthermore, even if terms granting 
rights were included in a contract, courts narrowly construed the coverage 
of the agreement against the employer.
16
  However, as will be discussed 
below, this trend has recently changed—especially after the DDB 
Technologies decision and the collaborative efforts inherent in many 
radical technological developments.
17
 
Nonetheless, although the theory of the ―individual genius‖ recognizes 
the individual work behind an invention, firms are still considered the 
―logical repositories‖ of legal rights over intellectual property 
developments.
18
  Firms have been defined as ―institutional vehicles in 
which complementary material, intellectual and financial resources are 
collected and organised [sic] to manage the risks inherent in innovative 
activity.‖
19
 Internationally the treatment of intellectual property rights 
differs and therefore causes inconsistencies,
20
 especially for firms with a 
global presence.  As the foundation of many patents has transformed from 
work of the ―individual genius‖ to one of ―team work,‖ particularly while 
subject to an employment agreement, courts have begun to interpret 
assignments with greater deference to the parties to the contract.  
Consequently, although it has been maintained that the lack of an express 
agreement represents that an employer has no interest in patents issued to 
or created by one of its employees,
21
 this view has shifted and evolved 
since the emergence of employment contracts, assignment provisions, and 
state courts‘ interpretation thereof. 
B.  The Rise of the Corporate Form and Employment Contracts 
Although patents were historically deemed representative of 
―individual genius,‖ such innovations are today considered products of a 
―collective enterprise‖ of creations and ideas.
22
  This transformation 
 
 16. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1187–88.  See also Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 F. 
403, 410 (3d Cir. 1905) (establishing that an assignment contract must be express and 
supported by clear evidence); Hopedale Mach. Co. v. Entwistle, 133 Mass. 443, 444 (1882) 
(holding that a contract granting the employer rights to the employee‘s invention developed 
while under employment did not apply after the contract expired even though parts of the 
innovation had been developed prior to the agreement‘s termination). 
 17. See infra Part II.B (describing the collective nature of innovative development 
prevalent in many companies today). 
 18. WILLIAM VAN CAENEGEM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INNOVATION, 94-95 
(2007). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 95 (discussing how each nation grants such rights differently). 
 21. Talbot v. Harrison, 270 N.Y.S. 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933). 
 22. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1133. 
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resulted in changes in corporate structure and led to the predominance of 
contracts in determining ownership of patents and inventions. 
The rising significance of contracts reflected not only a change in 
legal discourse, but also a change in actual practice in the workplace.  As 
firms grew in size, they began to invest in research and development and as 
personnel management became increasingly organized and bureaucratized, 
employers began to also be more systematic in their handling of employee-
inventors.  Employers more frequently required that all employees who 
were likely to invent sign agreements assigning their potential inventions to 
their employer.
23
  Furthermore, because patents are ―reward[s] to those who 
. . . exert their abilities, employ their time, and spend their money in the 
production of something new and useful to the community,‖
24
 tension 
arises when an employer has control over or owns the time, money, and 
resources utilized in the creation of such patents. 
Employers seek to maximize the benefit of employees‘ ―individual 
genius‖ while minimizing the costs associated with such benefits.  Costs 
include the employee allocating her time, while working, to developing a 
patent that may not constitute a direct part of her position‘s 
responsibilities.
25
  Nonetheless, employers often have an advantageous 
position in negotiating for ownership and use of their employees‘ 
inventions because of the greater resources employers make available to 
their employees, consultants, and contractors.
26
  Innovators often lack the 
access to such resources when developing patentable ideas while 
unemployed.
27
 
As a result, employment contracts are not only significant in 
protecting both the employer and employee, but also in encouraging and 
 
 23. Id. at 1185. 
 24. RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT 19 (William Benning ed., 2d ed. 1844). 
 25. This opportunity cost is often a disadvantage to employers.  The employee 
developing an independent innovation could be utilizing that same time to develop or work 
on projects under her exclusive employment responsibilities.  Opportunity costs are 
significant when conducting a cost-benefit analysis for such situations because they 
―represent the value of a forgone opportunity when some other choice is made.‖  Elchanan 
Cohn & Samuel T. Cooper, Multi-Product Cost Functions for Universities: Economies of 
Scale and Scope, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 579, 588 
(Geraint Johnes & Jill Johnes eds., 2004). 
 26. This presumes that the employee would not have access to such advantages if she 
were unemployed or working for a different enterprise.  Nonetheless, these stronger 
resources frequently consist of, but are not limited to, greater financial resources, networks 
and contacts in a particular industry, and equipment to produce and perfect a particular 
product or service.  In addition, the talent, expertise, and input of co-workers and other 
employment-related colleagues are particularly pertinent especially for patents, which are 
increasingly becoming products of collaborative efforts.  Fisk, supra note 6, at 1192. 
 27. Id.  See also infra Parts III.B and IV (discussing the benefits inventors garner while 
employed). 
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supporting the ongoing growth of technological innovation.
28
  The National 
Venture Capital Association (―NVCA‖) conducts an annual study, entitled 
Venture Impact: The Economic Importance of Venture Capital-Backed 
Companies in the U.S. Economy, which, in 2008, found that venture-
backed companies corresponded to 21% of the United States Gross 
Domestic Product (―U.S. GDP‖).
29
  This percentage increased by nearly 
25% since 2006 when it was determined that only 17.6% of U.S. GDP was 
contributable to such companies.
30
  Most importantly, the many innovations 
developed by venture-backed companies have been and continue to be 
―disruptive technologies‖ which lead to groundbreaking patents and 
advancements.
31
  These technologies may build upon prior inventions or 
more importantly establish and launch novel and radical ideas that are new 
to their respective markets.  This is the type of technological growth that is 
 
 28. The greater resources provided by a firm are the foundation for the support of 
continuing innovation.  See contra Michele Boldrin & David Levine, Intellectual Property 
and the Efficient Allocation of Social Surplus from Innovations, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 
DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE, supra note 15, at 93, 107 (explaining that 
excluding a few exceptions, ―[intellectual property] is not necessary for efficient 
innovation‖).  ―The efficient allocation of surplus from innovation can and would be 
achieved by properly regulated competitive markets, and such distribution . . . could provide 
the correct incentives for the efficient amount of creation to take place in society.‖  Id. 
 29. NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, 2 (2009), 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=103 
[hereinafter NVCA REPORT]. 
 30. In 2008, the Head of Research at the National Venture Capital Association 
explained the process behind the study relating revenues of venture-backed companies to 
U.S. GDP.  Calculating the percentage involved finding all companies funded by venture 
capital between the 1970s and 1990s.  Although many of those firms were no longer in 
existence, those that survived were evaluated through Dun and Bradstreet databases.  The 
total revenue of the venture-backed firms analyzed was then summed and compared to U.S. 
GDP.  Telephone Interview with John Taylor, Head of Research, National Venture Capital 
Association (Apr. 8, 2008).  Although there is some criticism as to the equitability of a 
revenue-to-GDP comparison, such concerns are mitigated by the Solow Growth Model.  See 
Shannon H. Hedvat, Entrepreneurial Engineers and Scientists: The Drivers Behind the Most 
Significant Innovations and Patents (May 9, 2008) (unpublished M.S.E. thesis, University of 
Pennsylvania) (on file with author) (describing the Solow Growth Model‘s theory that 
capital, labor, and total product growth rates will be the same in the long run only if 
technological progress is non-existent) (citing ROBERT M. SOLOW, GROWTH THEORY: AN 
EXPOSITION ix-190 (2d ed. 2000); Press Release, Nobel Prize, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize 
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987: Robert M. Solow (Oct. 21, 1987)). 
 31. NVCA REPORT, supra note 29.  Disruptive technologies frequently result in what 
many scholars consider ―significant patents.‖  The significance of a patent is determined by 
various factors including the number of subsequent citations of the given invention in other 
patents and applications.  ZOLTAN J. ACS AND DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL 
FIRMS, 51-52 (1991); DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION, 31-37 
(1995); Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of 
Innovations, RAND J. ECON., 1990, at 172-87.  This measurement is often scaled by the 
elapsed time since the publication and issuance of the patent being evaluated. 
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sought by venture capitalists and innovation experts. 
Therefore, many significant inventions are being developed at and 
supported by both start-up and long established firms.  The ownership and 
protection of patents granted as a result of these innovations are important 
for employees, employers, and (potential) investors.  Although in the late 
1890s courts‘ reasoning for enforcing assignment provisions was based on 
the theory that ―employment provided opportunities for invention,‖
32
 
decisions today focus more on the ―collective nature of research and 
development.‖
33
 
Research and development hiring has resulted in the categorization of 
patents into three areas:  firm-owned, firm-related, and independent.
34
  
These groups may be incorporated into employment contract provisions by 
utilizing them in defining specific patent rights, assignments, and 
distinctions.
35
  As a result, the invention development process and the 
benefits garnered by both employers and employees with respect to 
innovations are vital when considering the effects of language used when 
forming employment contracts.
36
 
 
 
 32. See Fisk, supra note 6, at 1192 (discussing the 1890s courts‘ enforcement of an 
assignment agreement in Hulse v. Bonsack Machine Co., 65 F. 864 (4th Cir. 1895)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J. 
LAW & TEC. 1, 7 (1999).  Merges defines each category as shown in the adapted table 
below: 
 
Type Invention Status Ownership 
Firm-Owned 
Inventor ―employed to 
invent‖ 
Firm owns outright 
Firm-Related 
Non-R&D inventor; 
invention related to 
employee duties or created 
with employer resources 
Split entitlement: employee 
owns patent, but firm has 
―shop right,‖ a limited, 
nontransferable license 
Independent 
Invention unrelated to 
employee duties or created 
without employer resources 
Employee owns outright 
 
 35. The categories are also important when evaluating the ―significance‖ of a patent. 
ACS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 31; AUDRETSCH, supra note 31; Hedvat, supra note 30. 
 36. The language used in employment contracts may improve the difficulties in 
assignment provisions if the type(s) of patents covered by the agreement are defined. See 
supra note 34 for a list and table of these patent categorizations. 
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III.  DDB TECHNOLOGIES LLC V. MLB ADVANCED MEDIA, LP:  A NEW AGE 
OF EMPLOYER RIGHTS 
Employment contracts and the interpretation thereof have traditionally 
been subject to state law.  However, ―the question of whether a patent 
assignment clause creates an automatic assignment or merely an obligation 
to assign is intimately bound up with the question of standing in patent 
cases . . . [and is therefore] treated . . . as a matter of federal law.‖
37
  This 
recent holding in DDB Technologies ―seemingly enhances the rights of 
employers,‖
38
 demonstrating a change in the trend of courts‘ protection of 
employers and employees.
39
 
A.  Background of DDB Technologies 
David Barstow, a former employee of Schlumberger Technology 
Corporation (―Schlumberger‖), founded DDB Technologies, LLC (―DDB‖) 
with his brother (not an employee of Schlumberger).
40
  While working for 
Schlumberger, Barstow and his brother developed a computer simulation 
program that ultimately resulted in the issuance of four patents.
41
  Although 
several employees confirmed that Schlumberger, or at least some of its 
employees, was aware of the program‘s development,
42
 the company never 
claimed ownership or rights to the product, especially since the firm was in 
an unrelated industry of oil wells.
43
  Nonetheless, Barstow left the firm in 
1994 to launch his new venture, DDB. 
In 2004, DDB filed a patent infringement suit against MLB Advanced 
Media (―MLB‖).
44
  At this point, from 1994 until 2005, Schlumberger did 
not assert any ownership interests in or rights to the patents granted for 
 
 37. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 38. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 298. 
 39. See supra Part II.A for the history of courts‘ treatment of employers and employees 
in contract disputes. 
 40. DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1286. 
 41. The developed program resulted in three ―Computer Simulation Patents‖ (U.S. 
Patent Nos. 5,526,479, 5,671,347, and 6,204,862) and one ―Pattern-Matching Patent‖ (U.S. 
Patent No. 5,189,630).  Id.  The former patents encompass ―a method for generating a 
computer simulation of a live event for display on a viewer‘s computer‖ while the latter 
relates to ―a method allowing a viewer to search for certain information about a live event.‖  
Id.  All four patents were ultimately assigned to Barstow and his brother in 1998, six years 
before the infringement suit was filed. 
 42. Id. at 1287. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1288.  The suit alleged that MLB ―provide[d] several Internet services related 
to baseball that infringe[d] the Computer Simulation Patents and the Pattern-Matching 
Patent.‖  Id.  See also supra note 41 for a list of the patents at issue. 
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Barstow‘s computer simulation program.
45
  Despite this inactivity, 
Schlumberger decided, a year after the suit was initiated, to enter into an 
agreement with MLB transferring ―all of Schlumberger‘s rights and interest 
in the patents in suit and granted MLB[] a retroactive license to practice 
under those patents.‖
46
  This agreement allowed MLB to seek dismissal of 
DDB‘s action against MLB for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
47
  
Although the district court granted MLB‘s motion to dismiss,
48
 the appeal 
by DDB provided the Federal Circuit with the opportunity to review the 
case.
49
 
The language of Barstow‘s employment contract
50
 granted 
Schlumberger the rights and ownership of patents that were developed 
under the agreement and were ―suggested by‖ or ―relate[d] . . . to‖ 
Barstow‘s work for the company.
51
  While the Federal Circuit admitted that 
the agreement language was ambiguous, it nonetheless held that the effect 
of the language was to automatically assign ownership of inventions to 
Schlumberger.
52
  This decision not only raises concerns because 
 
 45. DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1293. 
 46. Id. at 1288. 
 47. MLB‘s motion was ―based on DDB‘s failure to join all owners of the patents in suit 
(including MLB[]) and on DDB‘s inability to pursue an infringement claim against MLB[] 
by virtue of its newly acquired ownership interest in those patents.‖  Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. The ultimate question before the court was ―whether the interest of Dr. David 
Barstow . . . in these patents was previously assigned to his former employer, Schlumberger 
. . . .‖  Id. at 1286. 
 50. The provisions in the employment agreement between Barstow and Schlumberger 
regarding ownership of employee inventions included: 
3. Employee shall promptly furnish to Company a complete record of any and 
all technological ideas, inventions and improvements, whether patentable or not, 
which he, solely or jointly, may conceive, make or first disclose during the 
period of his employment with [Schlumberger].  
4. Employee agrees to and does hereby grant and assign to Company or its 
nominee his entire right, title and interest in and to ideas, inventions and 
improvements coming within the scope of Paragraph 3: 
a) which relate in any way to the business or activities of [Schlumberger], 
or  
b) which are suggested by or result from any task or work of Employee 
for [Schlumberger], or  
c) which relate in any way to the business or activities of Affiliates of 
[Schlumberger], 
together with any and all domestic and foreign patent rights in such ideas, 
inventions and improvements. Employee agrees to execute specific assignments 
and do anything else properly requested by [Schlumberger], at any time during 
or after employment with [Schlumberger], to secure such rights. 
Id. at 1287. 
 51. Id. at 1290. 
 52. Id.  The court further clarified that as a result of this holding, DDB‘s defenses based 
HEDVATFINALIZED_SEVEN_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2011  9:32 PM 
826 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
Schlumberger failed to object to Barstow‘s full ownership and use of the 
patents for over a decade,
53
 but also because it demonstrates the federal 
courts‘ move toward a pro-employer approach for patent assignments. 
B.  Effects of DDB Technologies on Employment Relationships 
The difficulties that arise from the DDB Technologies holding are 
magnified by the language chosen by employers when drafting 
employment agreements.  Although federal law governs the interpretation 
of patent assignment provisions (according to the Federal Circuit in DDB 
Technologies), and therefore creates uniformity, general contract 
interpretation is still under state law jurisdiction.  Judge Pauline Newman, 
in her dissenting opinion in DDB Technologies, emphasized that contracts 
are ―creatures of state law . . . [and] they should be governed by whatever 
contractual law was binding on the parties at the time.‖
54
  The separation 
created by the majority in DDB Technologies undermines the benefits often 
sought by companies when selecting a particular state for incorporation or 
an applicable law provision in contracts.  Nonetheless, employers and 
employees must now carefully consider the terms comprising a patent 
assignment clause, if any. 
Corporations and firms maintain that the DDB Technologies decision 
only highlights the advantages of ―put[ting] [the inventions and patents] in 
[employers‘] hands‖ because the employee, on her own, ―can‘t handle it.‖
55
  
However, this conclusion assumes that the employees creating such 
inventions would not have been able to launch their own ventures or have 
access to the resources needed to succeed in the development of a new 
(patentable) innovation if they were unemployed.  Nonetheless, it is 
possible for an employee to unexpectedly develop a new idea while 
employed,
56
 even if the project is unrelated to her official responsibilities.  
 
on estoppel, waiver, and statute of limitations were without merit.  Id. 
 53. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 306. 
 54. Id. at 308.  See also DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1294 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(―Interpretation of employment contracts, including clauses establishing employer-employee 
obligations with respect to inventions and patents, is a traditional state matter.  This is a 
quite different issue from ‗standing in patent cases . . . .‘‖). 
 55. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 309. 
 56. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical 
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 
1225 n.244 (1984) (―[C]onglomerate firms obtain economies of scale when conducting 
basic research, because technological innovation resulting from such research is often 
unpredictable, and hence the diversified firm with more product lines stands a greater 
chance of benefiting from an unexpected innovation.‖  (citing Nelson, The Simple 
Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 302 (1959))).  See also Harry 
McCraken, The Patents of Steve Jobs: Ten Unexpected Inventions that add up to a Portrait 
of Apple’s CEO, TECHNOLOGIZER, May 28, 2009, http://technologizer.com/2009/05/28/the-
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This does not suggest, however, that the individual would have been unable 
to successfully create the invention if she were not employed, even if the 
concept precipitated from her work.
57
 
Consequently, it is imperative for employees, more than employers in 
many situations, to carefully analyze the language used in labor 
agreements.  The DDB Technologies decision stands for the proposition 
that an employer is entitled to the work an employee has accomplished on 
the employer‘s time and through the use of the employer‘s laboratories and 
equipment.  This right is realized even if the employee was not hired to 
invent and the ultimate innovation does not relate to the firm‘s business.
58
  
The holding grants employers even more leverage in negotiating contracts 
than they previous had. 
Before DDB Technologies, employers were viewed as having a 
significant bargaining advantage when hiring employees and drafting 
related agreements.
59
  Now, however, not only are employers granted 
authority over patents when express language is provided in an 
employment contract,
60
 but they are also entitled to bring suit to obtain 
ownership rights of former employees‘ patents that they did not 
demonstrate interest in or control over for several years (as in DDB 
Technologies).
61
  This effect also impacts the effective termination of such 
contracts, as demonstrated by Barstow‘s situation. 
Furthermore, drafters of employment contracts must also be cautious 
in structuring the terms of automatic assignments so there is no ambiguity.  
For example, defining ownership only for those inventions ―related to‖ the 
industry in which the firm operates or the responsibilities for which the 
employee was hired leaves great room for dispute, as shown in DDB 
 
patents-of-steve-jobs/ (describing ―unexpected‖ patents developed by Steve Jobs that have 
been vital to the recent successes of Apple). 
 57. This is particularly pertinent as capital and investment opportunities for inventions 
are more accessible and varied than before.  Steve Lohr, Turning Patents into ‘Invention 
Capital,‘ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at B1.  Therefore, investments can be sought by 
individual entrepreneurs and innovators, which may ultimately diminish the reliance of 
these individuals on employer firms for such advantages. 
 58. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 301. 
 59. PATRICK J. CIHON & JAMES OTTAVIO CASTAGNERA, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 
(6th ed. 2008); RICHARD EDWARDS, RIGHTS AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE 
POST-UNION ERA 51 (1993) (discussing how the ―asymmetry in the bargaining powers of an 
employer and the individual worker‖ was one of the key factors in the legalization of labor 
unions). 
 60. An example of express language is:  ―Agrees to and does hereby grant and assign.‖  
―Hereby assign[ing]‖ such invention and patent rights creates an automatic legal assumption 
of ownership.  Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 308. 
 61. The time delay Schlumberger was permitted before demonstrating its ownership in 
DDB Technologies was, however, influenced in part by the state law under which Barstow‘s 
employment contract was formed.  DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1290. 
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Technologies.
62
  Companies are advised by legal counsel to ―ensure that 
patent assignment provisions effect a current and express assignment of 
present and future inventions in their employment agreements in light of 
the decision in DDB Technologies.‖
63
  More significantly, subsequent 
courts have adopted the reasoning and holding of the Federal Circuit in 
DDB Technologies,
64
 indicating that potential innovators will now be faced 
with more difficult decisions in obtaining employment.  Although the risks 
and uncertainty in developing innovations are less when working for a 
larger firm,
65
 the protection of one‘s ―individual genius,‖ that was prevalent 
and supported by the legal system for many years
66
 is lost when 
assignments are construed to be automatic. 
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF PATENTS AND INNOVATIONS TO EMPLOYERS 
AND EMPLOYEES 
The reasoning behind employees‘ decisions to maintain jobs at firms 
with significant research and development divisions is often questionable 
because of the control that employees may lose over their ideas and 
 
 62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the employment contract at 
issue in DDB Technologies); infra note 104 (examining similar disputes that arise under 
copyright law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1976)).  In addition, in academia settings, it has 
been argued that after DDB Technologies ―draftspersons of university intellectual property 
policies charged with creating an automatic assignment would be well-served to include 
express language to the effect that the assignment is automatic.‖  Anthony J. Luppino, 
Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated 
Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 367, 392-93 (2009). 
 63. Robert N. Holtzman et al., Employment Law and Intellectual Property Alert: 
Federal Circuit Supplants State Law to Interpret Patent Assignments in Employment 
Agreements, KRAMER LEVIN (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/Publication/6f9ad442-24de-4da7-978f-
01cb5697ac73/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2b14750e-6f78-401e-8303-
056221f91727/Employment%20Law_IP%20Alert.pdf. 
 64. See Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 
Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the holding in DDB Technologies 
with respect to statutes of limitations and automatic assignments); Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., 
711 F. Supp. 2d 173, 182 (D. Mass. 2010) (―There is a distinction between an agreement 
that automatically assigns the patent as soon as the invention comes into being, and an 
agreement that merely creates an obligation to assign the patent in the future.‖); EMD Crop 
Bioscience, Inc. v. Becker Underwood, Inc., No. 10-cv-283, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116626, 
at *13 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2010) (explaining that the Federal Circuit ―applies federal law to 
determine the validity and terms of an assignment for patent rights‖); STMicroelectronics, 
Inc. v. Harari, No. 05- 04691, 2008 BL 192449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008) (applying the 
DDB Technologies standard that automatic assignments of patents is governed by federal 
law). 
 65. Merges, supra note 34, at 30.  Risks and uncertainty are considered less when 
employed by a larger firm because of the increased access to financial and technological 
resources. 
 66. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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innovations.  Employees are likely to be disadvantaged in the protection 
and ultimate ownership of their inventions when working for larger 
corporations.  However, obtaining such employment reduces the high 
degree of uncertainty and risk associated with research and development.
67
  
While ―[i]t is clear . . . that an inventor may use the services, ideas, and aid 
of others in the process of perfecting his invention without losing his right 
to a patent,‖
68
 there is still a question of who obtains the rights when the 
patent is granted, especially when the inputs into the development of the 
idea belong to a company.
69
 
A.  Employees’ Incentives at Larger Firms 
Innovators who seek to establish disruptive technologies
70
 are faced 
with two general options:  to work for a large firm with significant research 
and development resources or to launch an entrepreneurial start-up 
venture.
71
  The latter choice has greater risk but offers higher returns and 
grants an inventor more control over the process.
72
  When an employee is 
strictly hired to invent, it is reasonable for the employer to expect to obtain 
full ownership and rights to any innovations and patents established under 
employment-related projects and obligations.
73
  However, when the 
invention is not directly related to the employee‘s responsibilities or the 
nature of the company‘s business, it is questionable whether the firm 
should acquire all the benefits.  Consequently, the specific language used in 
an employment contract is vital in resolving such disputes.
74
 
 
 67. Merges, supra note 34, at 30.  Such uncertainties include the risks an innovator 
undertakes when investing various resources into new and not yet developed ideas. 
 68. Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm‘n, 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(emphasis added). 
 69. These inputs include, but are not limited to, labor, financial resources, and technical 
and lab equipment.  A company‘s type of business and its divisions greatly affect the 
resources available to its employees and the extent to which collaboration (or co-authorship 
for copyrights) is possible. 
 70. See supra note 31 and Part II.B (discussing disruptive technologies). 
 71. Merges, supra note 34, at 31. 
 72. Entrepreneurs are frequently also the engineers and inventors behind the technology 
or product prompting the start of a new company.  Hedvat, supra note 30.  Such firms are 
often smaller because ―in industries that are highly innovative and comprise predominantly 
of large firms, the relative innovative advantage [is] found to be held by small enterprises.‖  
AUDRETSCH, supra note 31, at 38. 
 73. If employees were permitted to allocate all the risk of innovation to a firm but then 
reap the benefits (of ownership and patent rights) if and when the invention succeeds, then 
―employees would claim ownership of valuable inventions, leaving the firm with worthless 
ones, and corporate [research and development] would grind to a halt.‖  Merges, supra note 
34, at 31.  A balance is necessary when evaluating the costs and benefits of owning 
employee innovations and patents. 
 74. See supra Part III (discussing the effects of assignment language in employment 
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In addition, courts have opposed the argument that innovation and 
trade will be stifled if employers continue to obtain rights to all future 
inventions of employees.
75
  The basis for this reasoning is founded in the 
belief that if inventors are unable to utilize the resources and opportunities 
given while employed at a large and successful corporation, then the public 
will not benefit from such inventors‘ potential.
76
  If the employee does not 
have the resources to pursue her ideas before obtaining employment, then 
when she is employed she is arguably afforded access to greater assets for 
the invention process while also being compensated through her salary.
77
  
Nonetheless, when drafting employment contracts it is unlikely that 
employers consider the public‘s and the inventor‘s best interests, especially 
in light of the incentives companies have in obtaining control of patent and 
invention rights from their employees.
78
 
B.  Employee Patents and the Effect on Competition and Antitrust 
Policies 
In a study analyzing the value of 222 patents in the United States, 
participant companies reported that almost 10% of their patents were worth 
over $100 million.
79
  Furthermore, 50.2% were valued above $1 million.
80
  
Companies in these particular sectors, such as high-technology firms and 
venture-backed technology start-ups,
81
 have a significant economic and 
 
contracts). 
 75. Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 F. 864, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1895); Merges, supra note 
34, at 31.  This view is supported by a more recent argument that intellectual property is not 
essential in encouraging innovation.  Boldrin & Levin, supra note 28.  Therefore, if 
intellectual property rights are the main assignments issued to employers (through 
employment contracts), then this reasoning is significant.  Moreover, the more substantial 
resources provided by and available at a firm are the foundation for the support of 
continuing innovation.  Id. 
 76. See Hulse, 65 F. at 868 (holding that an employment contract was not against public 
policy as it allowed the inventor to benefit from the corporation‘s resources); Merges, supra 
note 34, at 31 (stating that a reason why inventors seek employment in research and 
development units of firms is to benefit from investments of the firms that are key to the 
invention). 
 77. An employee‘s salary is a benefit, on some levels, because if one were to launch her 
own venture, it is likely that she would be dependent upon investors and debt while lacking 
an independent source of income.  Nonetheless, the risks associated with not having a steady 
salary (i.e., starting a new business) often reap greater results that do benefit the public (i.e., 
radical technological advancements and innovations). 
 78. Bigger firms, with higher employment, may benefit most because of the increased 
probability of invention development across the larger number of employees.  Coffee, Jr., 
supra note 56, at 1225. 
 79. F.M. SCHERER, PATENTS: ECONOMICS, POLICY AND MEASUREMENT, 269 (2005). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Another sector where patent rights, particularly in software, have had an increasing 
importance is the financial industry.  Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest: Patents on 
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competitive motivation in seeking the automatic assignment of employees‘ 
inventions, particularly given the high value of radical patents.
82
  Many 
firms may find it more efficient to control inventions that correspond to 
their commercial and technological profile because they can assemble the 
complementary skills and resources necessary to maximize innovations‘ 
uses.
83
  Consequently, the DDB Technologies holding, by appearing to 
favor employers,
84
 only furthers their competitive advantages in not only 
negotiating employment contracts but also in gaining market power. 
Competition and antitrust policies are also directly related to 
intellectual property rights.
85
  For example, the Global Competitiveness 
Report, produced annually by the World Economic Forum, ranked the 
United States, for 2009-2010, in the top ten of 133 countries for capacity 
for innovation, company spending research and development, and 
availability of scientists and engineers, among other areas.
86
  Furthermore, 
 
Wall Street, in PROPERTY RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 15, at 116, 117-19. 
 82. Radical patents and innovations are similar to disruptive technologies.  See supra 
note 31.  Radical inventions are often compared to incremental innovations.  The ―disruptive 
quality‖ and characteristics of radical innovations include being ―outside the predicted 
pattern.‖  What is Accelerated Radical Innovation?, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON 
ACCELERATED RADICAL INNOVATION, 1 (Mar. 2005), http://www-
iwari2005.eng.utoledo.edu/pages/pdfs/WhatIsAcceleratedRadicalInnovation.pdf (citing 
JOHN A. BERS & JOHN P. DISMUNKES, ROADMAP FOR A RADICAL INNOVATION COMMUNITY OF 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (2004) (unpublished manuscript)).  ―Unlike most incremental 
innovation, which is based either on well-developed science or existing technology, radical 
innovation makes a dramatic impact on innovation performance by explicitly linking 
directly into the concurrently expanding scientific frontiers of pure and user-inspired basic 
research . . . .‖  Id. at 2. 
 83. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 18, at 95. 
 84. See Stephen G. Charkoudian et al., Patents, Employment Contracts and Automatic 
Assignment: Federal Law Holds Sway, IP ADVISOR (Goodwin Proctor, Boston, Mass.) Apr. 
2008, http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Attorney-Articles/2008/Automatic-
Assignment-IP-Advisor-April-2008.aspx (stating that if assignment-of-invention clauses are 
drafted properly, employers can seek comfort in the fact that they will automatically own 
employees‘ inventions at the time of creation); Holtzman et al., supra note 63 (stating that 
employers can be reasonably certain assignment-of-invention clauses will be uniformly 
interpreted under federal law to automatically assign ownership of employees‘ inventions to 
employers regardless of contrary state law).  See also Lisa Treannie & Howard Zaharoff, 
DDB Technologies: Beware the IP Assignment Clause, IP NEWS (Morse Barnes-Brown 
Pendleton PC, Waltham, Mass.), Jan. 2009, 
http://www.mbbp.com/resources/iptech/newsletters/pdfs/IPNews-IPAssignmentClause.pdf; 
Darin Snyder, Employment Agreements and Assignment of Patents by Employees, 
O‘MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Mar. 21 2008), 
http://www.omm.com/newsroom/publication.aspx?pub=607. 
 85. Mattias Ganslandt, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, in 
FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS AND GLOBALIZATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND 
TRADE 233 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008). 
 86. WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009-2010, 15 (Klaus 
Schwab ed., 2009) [hereinafter WORLD. ECON. FORUM 2009-2010], available at 
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in 2006-2007, the correlation between the index for antitrust effectiveness
87
 
and the index of intellectual property protection
88
 was 0.90 in the United 
States.
89
  These indices and rankings, particularly in the United States, 
further emphasize the strong relationship between a firm‘s position and 
market control in its business sector and its intellectual property rights, 
protection, and developments. 
Therefore, companies are incentivized to seek acquisition of their 
employees‘ inventions that will or have already resulted in patent 
protection.  While supply of the labor to produce such intellectual property 
is high,
90
 demand is also at its peak as the advantages of acquiring such 
employees provide economic, financial, and competitive benefits for a 
company, in its respective market(s).  Although a higher supply may yield 
greater negotiating power for the employers when seeking innovators, 
employers are not benefited by contractual terms below those automatically 
assigning all patent and invention rights to the company.  These provisions, 
however, are not favored by the sought-after employees. 
Nonetheless, while innovation enhances the efficiency and growth of a 
particular firm in its respective market,
91
 the incentive to innovate may be 
stifled if the firm is unable to acquire the necessary talent.
92
  Employees 
may not accept particular employment if a similar situation to that in DDB 
Technologies arises or may arise.
93
  Furthermore, if an employee needs an 
 
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf. 
 87. While there is variation in how ―antitrust effectiveness‖ may be defined, elements 
considered in the analysis and computation of the figure include a region‘s local competition 
level, commitment to corruption, and effective decision-making and regulation of antitrust 
policy.  D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust 
Agency Capacity, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1081 n.4 (2009). 
 88. The International Intellectual Property Rights Index (―IPRI‖) captures countries‘ 
―strength and effectiveness [in] their property rights protection . . . [as] a useful tool for 
policymakers, academics, business leaders, think tanks, and other researchers.‖  
ALEXANDRA C. HORST, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX (IPRI): 2007 REPORT 1 
(2007), 
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/UserFiles/File/PRA_Interior_LowRes.pdf. 
 89. Ganslandt, supra note 85, at 235 (citing WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2006-2007 (2006)). 
 90. WORLD ECON. FORUM 2009-2010, supra note 86, at 14. 
 91. Ganslandt, supra note 85, at 234. 
 92. Although courts previously rejected the proposition that employers‘ ownership of 
employees‘ patents would stifle innovation, Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 F. 864 (4th 
Cir. 1895); Merges, supra note 34, at 31, the position is stronger now after the decision in 
DDB Technologies granting employers even greater control and authority over inventions of 
their employees. 
 93. In particular, the ability of a firm to claim ownership of a (former) employee‘s 
patent(s), after not demonstrating any intent or authority over such innovations for more 
than ten years, raises concerns for potential employees.  Furthermore, although the time 
allowed in DDB Technologies was partially dependent upon the state law under which the 
agreement was made, the effects of the decision are undoubtedly beneficial for employers 
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income and therefore opts to obtain a position at a larger firm, she may be 
reluctant to further the development of an idea or innovation.
94
  The 
inclination to stall the growth of her invention may be grounded in the fact 
that her employer, potentially in an unrelated industry to her idea, may be 
the automatic owner of any future patents and inventions.  In addition, 
employers are now instructed by legal counsel
95
 to be more diligent in 
making certain that assignment provisions are carefully drafted to 
encompass the maximum coverage possible.
96
  Employees, however, do not 
always have equal access to legal advice and support. 
V.  HOW EMPLOYERS‘ ACTIONS AND DECISIONS MAY CHANGE 
Employers, among other groups, are affected by the DDB 
Technologies decision on different levels.
97
  However, the effects and 
changes that will be witnessed over the next several years are uncertain as 
this case was one of ―first impression.‖
98
  The Federal Circuit explained 
that even if a contract asserts that it is established under a particular state‘s 
law, provisions regarding patent assignments will nonetheless be regulated 
under federal law.
99
  Consequently, decisions to incorporate under or to 
enter into contracts subject to a specific state‘s law and jurisdiction are no 
longer as controlling and significant, at least when seeking a legal system 
favoring employers‘ rights to employees‘ inventions.
100
  This also 
influences consultant and contractor agreements that cover various 
territories and extend over state lines.  Therefore, such agreements may be 
subject to differing legal authorities.
101
  Uniformity, however, has 
 
especially since federal law has been deemed to control such provisions‘ interpretation.  Bd. 
of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 
832, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2009); DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 
1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 94. Her opportunity cost of giving up the development of her invention for employment 
(and an income) may be low enough to justify her not spending ―work‖ time to further 
develop a personal innovation.  For a discussion on opportunity costs, see supra note 25. 
 95. For examples of law firms‘ memorandums and news releases on DDB Technologies 
and its effects on employers (and employees), see supra note 84. 
 96. Treannie & Zaharoff, supra note 84. 
 97. For a further discussion, see supra Parts III and IV. 
 98. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 307. 
 99. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 100. See contra id. at 1294 (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining that contract 
interpretations and disputes are matters left to state law).  See also Baniak & Dawson, supra 
note 4, at 308 (stating that the decision to grant federal jurisdiction over patent assignment 
clauses is justified particularly because patents are ―federal concepts‖ and some employees 
are located in ―nonemployer-based‖ states). 
 101. See Samuel W. Apicelli & Jane Leslie Dalton, Duane Morris LLP, When ‘Will’ 
Won’t Do In Employment Agreements, LAW 360 (Portfolio Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.), 
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advantages as employers and employees can more easily anticipate the 
potential consequences of including or excluding certain language.
102
 
Although patents are governed by federal law, other areas of 
intellectual property may not be subject to the same treatment.  Therefore, 
the effects of the DDB Technologies decision may be limited to patents 
and, as a result, only to certain industries.
103
  The strength of the uniformity 
argument for the decision consequently is diminished; while consistency 
may be imparted in patent assignment disputes, it is not the case for 
disagreements over the assignments of all intellectual property developed 
under employment.
104
 
In addition, disputes often arise over intellectual property ownership 
in academic and university settings.  ―Transition to a more patent-sensitive 
environment has particular implications for the academic sector, [in 
addition to] industrial sectors that traditionally rely on free and open 
exchange . . . .‖
105
  Some universities are ―fighting for talent‖ while 
becoming more liberal because they are trying to bring in (graduate) 
students and professors who will succeed in inventing products or ideas 
and/or even launching start-ups,
106
 a potential effect that may occur in the 
corporate setting if the need for inventive labor is high and the demand is 
even greater.  Nonetheless, professors and graduate students, in certain 
 
Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/apicellidalton_law360_0908.pdf 
(explaining that uniformity of federal interpretation is beneficial for companies with 
employees in multiple states). 
 102. Boilerplate contracts, for example, help parties to an agreement anticipate potential 
provisions and terms.  In particular, boilerplates have been found to be ―a trade-off between 
communicating intensively in a narrow sphere or communicating in a more stripped-down 
formal way in a wider variety of contexts.‖  Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: 
Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (2006). 
 103. The industries significantly impacted by the DDB Technologies decision may not be 
limited to those industries dependent upon patented inventions (such as high-technology and 
pharmaceutical companies).  However, it is more likely to be of higher significance to 
employers seeking innovative development (that may result in patents) from their 
employees than to employers participating in other types of business sectors.  Nonetheless, 
from an efficiency and cost-benefit perspective, employers would prefer employee time be 
dedicated to company-related projects rather than individually-driven developments, 
particularly with unknown ownership of certain future innovations. 
 104. In copyright law, employment related disputes that often arise are under the ―work 
made for hire‖ provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1976).  
The statute(s) requires an inquiry into the employment relationship and the scope of the 
employment at issue.  See e.g., Avtec Sys. v. Pfeiffer, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the employee‘s software program developed at home was not a work made for hire 
because it was unrelated to assignments under his employment); Cramer v. Crestar Fin. 
Corp., 67 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that the computer program Cramer 
developed was the type of work he was hired to perform even though it was created at home 
and on his own initiative). 
 105. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 18, at 96. 
 106. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 313. 
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programs, are in similar situations when evaluating where to attend and 
how the products of their ―intellectual genius‖ will be protected or 
owned.
107
 
Finally, investors‘ decisions to financially support different 
companies, particularly new ventures, may be affected by the DDB 
Technologies decision.  Although many start-up companies are founded by 
the entrepreneurial engineer behind a groundbreaking idea,
108
 often times 
companies acquire a variety of talent in order to see that they succeed.
109
  
Consequently, employment contracts in these situations must be carefully 
drafted to ensure that the start-up will obtain all rights and ownership upon 
the patenting of employee-driven inventions.  The guarantee of innovation 
ownership will be of high importance to potential angel investors and 
venture capitalists.
110
  ―In the technology industries that venture capitalists 
target, sustainable competitive advantages normally derive from 
intellectual property and innovative ability.  Unless a venture firm sees the 
potential for patents or some other form of protected intellectual property, 
it is unlikely to invest.‖
111
  Therefore, new companies seeking investment 
will have to balance between demonstrating their ability to obtain the 
necessary talent
112
 to achieve their goals while also establishing and 
enforcing employment provisions assigning patent ownership and rights to 
the firm. 
 
 
 107. Although beyond the scope of this study, please refer to the following for an 
analysis of patent and invention ownership in the academic setting:  Sunil R. Kulkarni, All 
Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should Have Complete Control over the 
Intellectual Property Rights in their Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (1995); Sandip H. 
Patel, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 
IND. L.J. 481 (1996). 
 108. See supra note 72 for a discussion on ―entrepreneurial engineers.‖ 
 109. See JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE THE LEAP . . . AND 
OTHERS DON‘T, 41-65, 216-17 (2001) (noting the significance of acquiring the right 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The DDB Technologies decision has and will continue to change and 
affect the way in which employment contracts are formed and interpreted.  
In addition, corporate decisions and activities will also be modified in 
response to DDB Technologies, particularly in industries interdependent 
upon innovation and its legal protection and ownership.  Although the 
ultimate effects of the case are uncertain and will become more apparent as 
courts begin to address similar issues as that in DDB Technologies, it is 
clear that debates and disputes will nonetheless occur because employer 
and employee goals and objectives often differ with respect to employees‘ 
individual inventions.  Notwithstanding the uncertainty of DDB 
Technologies‘s future effects, employers will seek to utilize language in 
employment contracts that establish a per se automatic assignment of 
patent rights and ownership.  Consequently, potential employees may stifle 
their ―individual genius‖ innovation development or refrain from obtaining 
employment at particular firms.  If the talent needed to develop the ground-
breaking, radical, and disruptive technologies is no longer afforded the 
benefits of large research and development divisions at various companies, 
the consequences on innovation and patents may be chilling. 
Nonetheless, the uniformity established by the Federal Circuit in DDB 
Technologies creates a new era where contracts are no longer strictly 
subject to state law.  This may undermine a corporation‘s strategic and 
careful choice of regional law governing its contracts and more 
significantly the state in which it selects to be incorporated.  However, 
uniformity in the interpretation of patent assignment provisions creates a 
potential inconsistency with similar terms for other forms of intellectual 
property, such as copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, created by 
employees.  As a result, the ―first impression‖ decision by the Federal 
Circuit not only affects the ownership and rights over patentable 
developments by employees but more significantly the decisions behind 
employment contracts and corporate structure. 
